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Abstract 
In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a 
common project (i.e, cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay 
their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the “social heuristics” 
hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have 
been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) 
and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013, Verkoeijen et al., 2014). This 
Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time 
pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, pre-registered replications of the 
critical conditions from Study 7 of the original paper (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned 
analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who 
met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of 
participants in the Time Pressure condition and 7.5% in the Forced Delay condition who did 
not adhere to the time constraints), and observed a difference in contributions of -0.37 
percentage points, compared to an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original 
data. Analyzing the data as the original paper did, including data only for participants who 
complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in 
contributions compared to a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In 
combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are 
consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time 
pressure on cooperation. 
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Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012) 
 
Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) argued that our social intuitions are shaped by our 
daily experiences, and that those intuitions can determine whether our default response is 
selfish or cooperative. According to this social heuristic hypothesis (formalized 
mathematically by Bear & Rand, 2016; but see Myrseth & Wollbrant, 2016), people who 
regularly experience and benefit from cooperation in their daily lives will tend to develop 
cooperative intuitions as a default response, and those who have non-cooperation rewarded 
will tend toward selfish intuitive responses. Although intuitions vary across people, 
deliberation is theorized to always favor self-interested behavior. For example, in one-shot, 
anonymous economic games, where selfish actions maximize one’s payoff, deliberation will 
favor non-cooperation, overriding any potential intuitive bias toward cooperation. The social 
heuristic hypothesis predicts more cooperation for judgments made intuitively (because some 
participants will default to cooperative responses) than when judgments are made with more 
deliberation (because deliberation will favor selfishness for all participants).  
Rand and colleagues (2012) conducted a series of studies to assess the social heuristics 
hypothothesis, using correlational, quasi-experimental and experimental designs. Two of 
these experiments manipulated time pressure in a one-shot public goods game, with one 
testing participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Study 6) and another testing college 
students in a lab (Study 7). In these experiments, participants were either required to decide 
how much to contribute to the group within 10 seconds (Time Pressure condition/intuitive 
decision making), or they were asked to wait at least 10 seconds before deciding on their 
contribution (Forced Delay condition/reflection). In both experiments, when non-compliant 
participants were removed prior to analysis, the mean contribution was greater in the 
intuition/time-pressure condition than in the reflection/forced-delay condition. However, 
when including all participants in an intent-to-treat analysis, thereby preserving random 
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assignment to conditions and avoiding selection biases, the contributions did not differ 
significantly between conditions in either experiment (Tinghög et al., 2013; they did differ 
significantly when combining across the two studies: Rand, Green, & Nowak, 2013).  
Since its publication, Rand et al.’s (2012) paper has been highly influential. Yet, some 
studies have not found a difference in cooperation between participants placed under time 
pressure and those forced to delay their decision (Lohse, 2016; Tinghög et al., 2013; 
Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). A recent meta-analysis of 51 published and unpublished 
studies (Rand, 2016; total N = 15,850; the included studies showed no evidence of publication 
bias using p-curve or Egger’s test) testing different ways to induce intuition/deliberation in 
one-shot economic cooperation games reported a positive link between intuition and 
cooperation for the subset of studies where defection is always payoff-maximizing (as in 
Rand et al, 2012 and in the unsuccessful replications cited earlier). However, the meta-
analysis also showed a great deal of heterogeneity across studies, and many studies did not 
find a significant effect when considered individually. 
One potentially critical issue involves how the analyses account for participants who 
did not comply with the time pressure instructions (Tinghög et al., 2013). In most studies 
using the time pressure and forced delay procedure, many participants in the time pressure 
condition respond too slowly (a substantially smaller proportion fail to respond slowly 
enough in the forced delay condition). Rand et al. (2012) restricted their analysis to 
participants who had adhered to the task instructions (a compliant-only analysis) rather than 
analyzing all participants assigned to each condition (an intent-to-treat analysis; an approach 
adopted by others, e.g., Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). Given the high exclusion rates 
and that compliance means different things in the two conditions (i.e., too fast in one 
condition and too slow in the other), a compliant-only analysis can introduce systematic 
differences between the participants in each condition. For example, a compliant-only 
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analysis might selectively eliminate slow-responding participants from the time pressure 
condition and not from the forced delay condition, thereby disrupting random assignment to 
conditions. Such selective exclusion could produce a spurious difference between conditions 
that is driven by selection bias (i.e., differences between the participants) rather than by the 
experimental intervention.  
Consistent with this possibility, correlational studies have found a negative correlation 
between response time and cooperation (Rand et al., 2012). Consequently, excluding slow 
respondents would be expected to introduce a bias favouring greater cooperation among the 
remaining participants in the time pressure condition; of those randomly assigned to the time 
pressure condition, the compliant only participants are more likely to be fast responding and 
more cooperative. Given that about 50% of the participants in Rand et al. (2012) failed to 
respond on time, selection biases could partly explain the difference between conditions in the 
compliant-only analysis. 
In contrast, an intent-to-treat analysis preserves random assignment because all people 
assigned to each condition are included in the analysis regardless of whether they adhered to 
the instructions. Consequently, it permits a valid causal inference about the generality of any 
observed difference between the conditions. However, it does not always allow a clear 
inference about the effectiveness of the treatment itself.  It gives an unbiased estimate of the 
direction of the effect, but can underestimate the potency of a treatment if some participants 
fail to adhere to the instructions. For example, if no participants adhered to the instructions, 
an intent-to-treat analysis would show no effect (the participants in the two conditions 
essentially did the same thing because none of them followed instructions). But, it would not 
test whether time-pressure would have been effective had participants in each condition 
actually followed the instructions. An intent-to-treat analysis tests whether there is a 
difference between people who were instructed to respond quickly and those who were 
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instructed to respond after a delay, regardless of whether they actually adhered to those 
instructions.  
For this RRR, we use an intent-to-treat analysis as our primary analysis because it 
does not undermine random assignment to conditions and thereby allows for an unbiased 
causal inference. Given that the original study analyzed the data by excluding non-compliant 
participants, our protocol specified that we too would do this analysis if more than 10 percent 
of participants failed to comply with the time constraints.  
In addition to these analyses, we conducted exploratory analyses that excluded 
participants with prior experience in tasks of this sort or who failed to comprehend the task. 
Participants who have had previous experience with economic games of this sort may have 
learned that their intuitions can lead them astray in one-shot games, and thus may be less 
likely to show the intuitive cooperation effect (Rand et al., 2012, 2014; Rand & Kraft-Todd, 
2014). And, participants who mistakenly believe that cooperation is payoff-maximizing (i.e., 
those who did not comprehend the nature of the task) will be more likely to cooperate even 
with deliberation (Strømland, Tjøtta, & Torsvik, 2016). In the analyses, we report the 
difference between the time pressure and forced delay conditions with and without these 
participants.  
In summary, the goal of this Registered Replication Report is to shed further light on 
the link between intuition and cooperation by assessing the size and variability of the 
difference in cooperation between participants responding under time pressure and those 
responding after a delay. More specifically, the RRR will replicate the between-subjects 
comparison (time pressure vs. forced delay) from Study 7 of Rand et al.’s (2012) study in a 
laboratory setting with college students as participants. The primary planned analysis includes 
all participants who met the protocol requirements and completed the task. The secondary 
analyses examine how the difference between conditions varies when excluding participants 
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who have had prior experience with tasks like this one, who fail comprehension checks, and 
who do not comply with the task requirements (other exploratory moderator analyses, 
including individualism/collectivism, are reported at https://osf.io/scu2f/).  
 
Protocol and participating laboratories 
The protocol for a replication of Study 7 from Rand et al. (2012) was developed by 
Samantha Bouwmeester and Peter Verkoeijen. The original study’s first author, David Rand, 
provided extensive input and guidance throughout the process, including providing the 
original materials and scripts. Perspectives on Psychological Science publicly announced a 
call for laboratories interested in participating in the RRR project on June 8, 2015, and after 
the July 6, 2015 deadline, 23 laboratories were accepted to join the project. Twenty-one 
laboratories completed the study, collecting enough data to meet the inclusion criteria. The 
final set of replications included studies from a range of institutions across 12 countries, with 
many participating laboratories headed by experts on decision making, public good games, 
and/or social psychology. Each laboratory pre-registered their plans for implementing the 
approved protocol, and these plans were pre-approved by the editor who verified that they 
met all of the requirements for the study. The results from all completed studies are included 
in this report, regardless of their outcome. 
The protocol specified minimum sample sizes, exclusion rules, and testing conditions, 
and each laboratory’s pre-registered implementation of the protocol specified their target and 
minimum sample size, testing setting, recruiting procedures, and other aspects of their 
implementation. All labs used the same experimental script for data collection, modifying it 
only when it was necessary to translate materials to languages other than English. The full 
protocol is available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/scu2f/), and that project 
page includes links to each participating laboratory’s implementation of the study.  
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Method 
Subjects 
The protocol required testing of at least 75 participants in each of the two conditions, 
and labs were strongly encouraged to test as large a sample as possible. With the minimum 
sample size, individual studies would be underpowered to reject the null hypothesis for the 
original sample size, but the goal of the RRR is not to determine whether each individual 
study obtains a statistically significant result. Rather, the goal is to estimate the effect size 
meta-analytically across studies. Consequently, these projects trade off power in individual 
studies against the desire to increase the number of participating laboratories. 
Participants were recruited from undergraduate subject pools or the equivalent, were 
between the ages of 18 and 34, and each sample included between 20% and 80% women. 
Participants received a show-up payment or course credit for participating, and they also had 
an opportunity to earn more money as a result of a public goods game (see below). The show-
up fees varied somewhat across laboratories depending on their typical payments for studies 
of this sort. For recruiting purposes, the study was described as a “study of decision making,” 
and other than the duration, location, and compensation, no other information was provided 
about the content of the study. In order to increase the likelihood that participants would be 
unfamiliar with studies of this sort, laboratories were encouraged to collect their data at the 
start of the semester and to recruit from student samples with less experience in psychology 
studies. The protocol also asked laboratories to collect data on prior study experience for each 
participant. 
Given the design of the study, participants were tested in groups that were multiples of 
4, with a minimum testing session size of 12 participants. In rare cases, when fewer than 12 
participants attended a scheduled session, data from groups with 8 participants were 
REGISTERED REPLICATION REPORT RAND ET AL., 2012 9 
permitted. Whenever the total number of participants to attend a session was not a multiple of 
4, the extra participants were paid a “show up” fee and were not tested (or were asked to 
return for a later session). The minimum group size ensured that participants believed the 
explanation that the payoff depended on other people and that they could not determine which 
of the other people in the room were in their group.  
Materials & Procedures 
The original study materials, including the instructions, scripts, and post-experiment 
questionnaires were converted into a Qualtrics script (http://www.qualtrics.com) that handled 
all data collection. The script is available at https://osf.io/scu2f/. Labs conducting testing in 
countries other than the United States and Canada translated the contents of the script and 
adapted the currency amounts to match a similar level of local purchasing power (see 
http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/compare_countries.jsp). These translated Qualtrics 
scripts are available on each lab’s project page.  
The Qualtrics script randomly assigned participants to a Time Pressure condition and a 
Forced Delay condition, with the constraint that approximately equal numbers of participants 
were assigned to each condition. The experimenter and other participants were blind to 
condition assignment, and participants were unaware of the existence of a condition different 
from their own. The Qualtrics script showed the following instructions to all participants: 
You have been randomly assigned to interact with 3 of the other people in the 
room. All of you receive this same set of instructions. You cannot participate in 
this study more than once. Each person in your group is given $4 for this 
interaction. You each decide how much of your $4 to keep for yourself, and 
how much (if any) to contribute to the group’s common project (from 0 to 400 
cents). All money contributed to the common project is doubled, and then split 
evenly among the 4 group members. Thus, for every 2 cents contributed to the 
common project, each group member receives 1 cent. If everyone contributes 
all of their $4, everyone’s money will double: each of you will earn $8. But if 
everyone else contributes their $4, while you keep your $4, you will earn $10, 
while the others will earn only $6. That is because for every 2 cents you 
contribute, you get only 1 cent back. Thus you personally lose money on 
contributing. The other people really will make this decision too – there is no 
deception in this study. Once you and the other people have chosen how much 
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to contribute, the interaction is over. None of you can affect each other's 
payoffs other than through the single decision in this interaction. 
 
 On the next screen, participants were asked to decide how much to contribute by using 
a slider, with a pointer that started in the center of the range and with several values marked 
(the starting position was not marked with a value). When participants moved the slider, it 
indicated the exact contribution for that slider position. Although the slider did not require a 
response, in order to select an exact contribution, participants needed to move the slider. If 
they pressed continue without moving the slider, their contribution was recorded as missing 
and their data were excluded from the analyses.  
Participants in the Time Pressure condition were told: “Please make your decision as 
quickly as possible. You must make your decision in less than 10 seconds!" The screen 
showed a timer that counted down from 10, stopping at zero. Participants in the Forced Delay 
condition were told: “Please carefully consider you [sic] decision. You must wait and think 
for at least 10 seconds before making your decision!"1 The screen showed a timer that 
counted up from 0 and continued counting until the participant responded. The script recorded 
each participant’s contribution and the time when they submitted their decision. Note that the 
original study did not use timers; during protocol development, David Rand suggested adding 
them based on his experience from subsequent studies. 
 After their decision, participants answered questions and surveys to measure: (a) 
comprehension of the task, (b) their justification for their contribution, (c) 
individualism/collectivism (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995), (d) experience 
with tasks of this sort, (e) experience with research participation more generally, (f) self-
reported perceptions of trust in others (a factor suggested by Rand as a possible moderator of 
the time-pressure effect), (g) awareness of the research hypothesis (PARH: cf. Rubin, Paolini, 
                                                 
1 We found the “you” vs. “your” typographical error only after some labs had begun data 
collection. We decided not to correct the error at that stage because we did not want to change 
the procedures and we felt it would not be confusing. 
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& Crisp, 2010), (h) sex, birth year, and country, and (i) how many of the participants in the 
room they knew.  
 As in the original study, participants were paid by randomly grouping them with 3 
other participants (without replacement) to determine the collective group contribution and 
payout amounts.  
Data Exclusions 
 Data were excluded for participants who were younger than 18 or older than 34 
(determined by subtracting their self-reported birth year from 2015; participants who did not 
report their birth year were excluded), who did not complete all tasks, who did not move the 
slider to select a specific contribution amount, or when the experimenter/computer incorrectly 
administered the task or instructions. Exclusion decisions that depended on a judgment of an 
experimenter were made by someone blind to condition assignment and before examining that 
participant's contribution in the public goods task. All data, including those from excluded 
participants, are provided on each laboratory's Open Science Framework page and on the 
main page for the RRR. Secondary meta-analyses report the results when excluding 
participants who had experience with studies like this one (Experience), who did not adhere to 
the time constraints (Non-Compliant), or who did not correctly answer the comprehension 
check questions (Non-Comprehending). The Experience analysis included only those 
participants who responded with a “1—nothing like this scenario” to the question: “To what 
extent have you participated in studies like this one before? (i.e. where you choose how much 
to keep for yourself versus contributing to benefit others).”    
 
Results 
 A total of 21 laboratories contributed data from a grand total of 3596 participants. 
Table 1 presents sample demographics for each participating laboratory. Appendix A provides 
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a brief description of each laboratory's study, including documentation of any departures from 
the official protocol or from their own pre-registered plans.  
Primary analysis 
Given that labs varied in the currency used to pay participants, we calculated each 
person's contribution as a percentage of the maximum possible contribution. For each lab, we 
then computed the mean percentage contribution in the Time Pressure and Forced Delay 
conditions and the difference in means between them (Pressure – Delay).  
The primary analysis includes all participants who met the protocol requirements and 
recorded a contribution (an intent-to-treat analysis). Figure 1 shows a forest plot and the 
results of a random-effects meta-analysis across all laboratories. Below that meta-analysis, it 
also provides the meta-analytic result when excluding Experienced (total included N = 2000 
in the analysis), Non-Compliant (total included N = 2276), or Non-Comprehending (total 
included N = 2304) participants, and when excluding all three (total included N = 792). Table 
2 summarizes the results for each laboratory separately for all participants and after applying 
the exclusion criteria.2 
                                                 
2 Participants from one lab (Srinivasan) had substantially longer response times in the time pressure condition 
than did those in all other labs, leading to more exclusions due to non-compliance. On the OSF page, we provide 
the same analyses excluding results from that one lab. The overall pattern of results does not change. 
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Figure 1. Forest plot and meta-analytic result for the difference in contributions between the 
Time Pressure and Forced Delay conditions. Studies in the forest plot are listed alphabetically 
by the last name of the first author for that lab’s study, with the original result presented at the 
top. The mean difference for each lab is indicated by a square, with the size of the square 
corresponding to the inverse of the standard error of the difference score for that lab. The 
error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around that laboratory’s mean difference. The 
diamonds in the Summary section represent the results of random-effects meta-analyses of the 
RRR studies, with the width of the diamond representing a 95% confidence interval around 
the meta-analytic difference. None of these meta-analyses includes the original Rand et al. 
(2012) result. The first diamond corresponds to the data in the forest plot and represents the 
primary planned meta-analysis with all participants. The next three diamonds show the meta-
analytic difference after excluding Experienced, Non-Compliant, or Non-Comprehending 
participants. The final diamond provides the meta-analytic difference when excluding 
participants who failed to meet any one of these criteria. A forest plot for the data excluding 
non-compliant participants is provided in the General Discussion section. Forest plots for the 
other meta-analyses are available at https://osf.io/scu2f/.  
  
 An intent-to-treat analysis of data from the original study showed an 8.6 [95% 
CI: -1.84, 19.00] percentage point difference in the amount contributed between the Time 
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Pressure (M = 49.4%) and Forced Delay (M = 40.8%) conditions.3 Across all participants, the 
meta-analytic effect size in the RRR was -0.37 percentage points [95% CI: -2.60, 1.86], a 
value smaller than observed in the original data and close to zero. The observed effects ranged 
from -9.36 to 7.87, and the variability across laboratories was consistent with what would be 
expected by chance (Q(20) =16.84, p = .66, I^2 = 2.72%).  
Analyses with data exclusions  
The pre-registered protocol specified that if more than 10% of participants failed to 
adhere to the time constraints, we would conduct a secondary analysis including only on those 
participants who complied with the time constraints (a compliant-only analysis; 34.1% and 
92.5% compliance in the Time Pressure and Forced Delay conditions respectively). In this 
analysis, the meta-analytic difference between conditions was 10.37 percentage points, 
compared to a 15.31 percentage-point difference for the same analysis in the original study. 
The variability across laboratories was somewhat larger, but not significantly different from 
what would be expected by chance (Q(20) = 29.22, p = .084, I^2 = 33.04%).  
The results of the meta-analyses excluding participants based on their experience or 
comprehension were similar to those of the primary meta-analysis that included all 
participants, with meta-analytical differences of -2.19 percentage points and -0.64 percentage 
points respectively. The variability across labs again was consistent with what would be 
expected by chance (Experienced: Q(20) = 25.31, p = .19, I^2 = 19.08%; Non-
Comprehending: Q(20) = 14.93, p = .78, I^2 = 8.06%). Furthermore, when applying all three 
of these exclusion criteria (experience, compliance, or understanding), the meta-analytic 
difference between conditions was 12.34 percentage points, with cross-lab variability 
                                                 
3 The result reported in the original paper excluded Non-Compliant participants, and found a 
15.31 percentage point difference in the amount contributed between the Time Pressure (M = 
58%) and Forced Delay (M = 42%) conditions. 
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consistent with what would be expected by chance alone (Q(18) = 15.20, p = .65, I^2 = 
0.94%). 
 Additional exploratory analyses examined the role of a number of other moderators, 
including trust in others, gender, age, individualism/collectivism, whether or not participants 
knew other participants, total studies participated in previously, and participation in deceptive 
studies. The results of these meta-analyses are presented in Table 3, and the associated forest 
plots are available at https://osf.io/scu2f/.  
General Discussion 
This RRR featured data from 21 laboratories and a total of 3596 participants. The 
studies were conducted according to a vetted design and the analysis scripts were created 
while blind to the actual outcomes of the studies (although they were updated to address 
formatting issues, to provide more complete output, and to correct errors). The primary 
planned analysis in the RRR—an intent-to-treat approach including all participants—revealed 
a difference in contributions of -0.37 percentage points between the time-pressure condition 
and the forced-delay condition. This meta-analytic result is close to zero and smaller than the 
8.6 percentage point difference computed from the original data. However, analyzing the data 
in the same way that the original paper did—a compliant-only analysis that excludes 
participants who did not adhere to the time constraints—revealed a difference in contributions 
between conditions of 10.37 percentage points, compared to a difference of 15.31 percentage 
points in the original study (see Figure 2). The larger difference for a compliant-only analysis 
than for an intent-to-treat analysis is consistent with data from the original study and with a 
recent meta-analysis (Rand, 2016) that reported a 1.3 percentage point difference for an 
intent-to-treat analysis and a 4.3 percentage point difference for a compliant-only analyis in 
the subset of studies using time pressure to induce intuitive decision making.  
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Figure 2. Forest plot for the difference in contributions between the Time Pressure and Forced 
Delay conditions after excluding participants who did not comply with the time constraints. 
Studies in the forest plot are listed alphabetically by the last name of the first author for that 
lab’s study, with the original result presented at the top. The mean difference for each lab is 
indicated by a square, with the size of the square corresponding to the inverse of the standard 
error of the difference score for that lab. The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 
around that laboratory’s mean difference. The diamond represents the results of random-
effects meta-analyses of the RRR studies, with the width of the diamond representing a 95% 
confidence interval around the meta-analytic effect size. The meta-analytic effect does not 
include the original Rand et al. (2012) result. 
 
The lack of a difference between the time-pressure and forced-delay conditions in the 
intent-to-treat analysis shows that instructing people to respond quickly or slowly had no 
effect on the amount of their contribution. The compliant-only analysis revealed a positive 
relationship between time pressure and contribution. However, this analysis does not allow 
for a causal inference because excluding participants based on their performance in the task 
can introduce a bias among the subjects assigned to each group that yields a spurious 
difference; any bias that undermines random assignment precludes a causal inference about 
the effect of time pressure on contributions. Excluding non-compliant participants could 
introduce many different forms of bias, and those biases could even vary depending on other 
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factors (e.g., whether or not cooperation is appealing in that task; Evans, Dillon, & Rand, 
2015; Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, & Fehr, 2015).  
When an intent-to-treat analysis shows no difference, the only way that a difference 
between conditions in a compliant-only analysis could be consistent with the effectiveness of 
the treatment would be if those participants who did not comply actually experienced a causal 
induction that resulted in a more extreme effect in the opposite direction. In this case those 
who did not comply with the time pressure instructions would have to have experienced a 
different treatment effect, one that made them even more deliberative than those who 
complied with the forced delay instructions. Although such a pattern is possible in principle, 
it would require additional empirical evidence to demonstrate that causal relationship in the 
absence of selection biases. It might also require adjustments to the social heuristic hypothesis 
to explain why those who did not comply would be more likely to deliberate than would those 
who were in the condition designed to induce deliberation. Without such evidence, the most 
straightforward interpretation of the pattern of results is that the difference in the compliant-
only analysis resulted from selection biases and that the RRR does not provide evidence for 
an effect of speeded versus delayed responses on cooperation.  
Conclusion 
Overall, the results of the primary analysis in this RRR showed essentially no 
difference in contributions between the time pressure and forced delay conditions: the point 
estimate went in the opposite direction of the hypothesis and was close to zero. A secondary, 
compliant-only analysis did show an approximately 10.37% difference between conditions 
(somewhat smaller than the original 15.31% difference). However, the compliant-only 
analysis does not allow for causal claims about the intervention due to potential selection 
biases.  
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Given the challenges of interpreting compliant-only analyses in the face of substantial 
exclusions, future studies of the effect of intuition on cooperation should strive to avoid high 
rates of non-compliance. One possibility would be to redesign the time-pressure procedures in 
such a way that participants can consistently meet the time constraints. Given the challenges 
in doing so and the need to define an arbitrary timing threshold between intuitive and 
deliberative judgments (i.e., a 10s cutoff), it might be more productive to test the social 
heuristic hypothesis using other ways of inducing intuitive or deliberative processing. 
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Appendix – Contributing Laboratories 
 
LEAD LAB 
 
Samantha Bouwmeester, Erasmus University 
Peter P. J. L. Verkoeijen, Erasmus University 
OSF page: https://osf.io/xz7jr/ 
A total of 185 students were recruited from the psychology subject pool from the Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Participants received course credits as a show-up fee and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 16 to 32 
in multiples of 4). After protocol-based exclusions, our  sample for the analysis consisted of 169 students (Time 
Pressure n=87; Forced Delay n=82). For English speaking students we used the provided English Qualtrics 
scripts. For the Dutch students , we used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (1) our study materials 
were translated into Dutch and (2) participants made their contributions in Euros with a maximum contribution 
for each participant of 4 Euro. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol.  
 
 
CONTRIBUTING LABS  
(Alphabetical by last name of first author) 
 
Balazs Aczel, Eotvos Lorand University 
Bence Palfi, Eotvos Lorand University 
Barnabas Szaszi, Eotvos Lorand University 
Aba Szollosi, Eotvos Lorand University 
OSF page: https://osf.io/f6jtm/ 
A total of 204 students (Time Pressure n=102; Forced Delay n=102) were recruited from the psychology subject 
pool at the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary. Participants received course credit as show-up fee and 
were tested in groups (group size of 12 in multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two 
changes: (1) our study materials were translated into Hungarian and (2) participants made their contributions in 
Hungarian Forint with a maximum contribution for each participant of 550 HUF. Although we used the pre-
registered Instruction which specified the maximum possible contribution as 1,100 HUF, for the game we 
decreased it to 550 HUF to reflect the local economic circumstances. In all other respects, we followed the 
official protocol. 
 
Thorsten G. H. Chmura, University of Nottingham 
Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez, University of Nottingham 
OSF page: https://osf.io/h9gxm/ 
A total of 192 students (Time Pressure n=96; Forced Delay n=96) were recruited from the CRIBS and CEDEX 
subject pool at the University of Nottingham. Participants were paid a show-up fee of £2.1 and were tested in 
groups (group size ranged from 35 to 40). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with one change: participants 
made their contributions in dollars and their final earnings were paid in GBP using the following exchange rate 
of $1.00 = £0.70. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol. Participants were recruited by offering a 
show-up fee of $3 = £2.1. 
 
Antonio M. Espín, Middlesex University 
Pablo Brañas-Garza, Middlesex University 
Praveen Kujal, Middlesex University. 
OSF page: https://osf.io/3auwr/ 
A total of 161 students (Time Pressure n=79; Forced Delay n=82) were recruited from the subject pool at 
Middlesex University London. Participants were paid a show-up fee of 5 Pounds and were tested in groups 
(group size ranged from 12 to 20 in multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with one change: 
participants made their contributions in Pounds, instead of Dollars, with a maximum contribution for each 
participant of 4 Pounds. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol. 
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Anthony M. Evans, Tilburg University 
Anna E. van 't Veer, Leiden University 
OSF page: https://osf.io/c765h/ 
A total of 152 students (Time Pressure n=76; Forced Delay n=76) were recruited from the psychology subject 
pool at Tilburg University. Participants received 30 minutes of participation credit and were tested in groups 
(group size ranged from 8 to 12 in multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (1) 
our study materials were translated into Dutch and (2) participants made their contributions in Euros with a 
maximum contribution for each participant of 4 Euro. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol.  
 
Fernando Ferreira-Santos, University of Porto 
Tiago O. Paiva, University of Porto 
Eva C. Martins, Maia University Institute ISMAI/CPUP 
Carlos Mauro, Catholic University of Portugal 
Fernando Barbosa, University of Porto 
OSF page: https://osf.io/z6jsu/ 
A total of 171 students (Time Pressure n=85; Forced Delay n=86) were recruited from the student body of the 
University of Porto, Maia University Institute - ISMAI, and the Catholic University of Portugal, Porto. 
Participants were paid a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 12 in 
multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with three changes: (1) our study materials were 
translated into Portuguese, (2) participants made their contributions in Euros with a maximum contribution for 
each participant of 2.00 Euro, and (3) before the beginning of the session, one of the researchers entered the 
computer ID into the Qualtrics survey (because all computers share one external Internet IP making it impossible 
to identify individual entries in Qualtrics); participants did not see this question. In all other respects, we 
followed the official protocol. 
 
Susann Fiedler, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 
Rima-Maria Rahal, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 
Minou Ghaffari, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 
OSF page: https://osf.io/hsdf3/ 
A total of 196 students (Time Pressure n=99; Forced Delay n=97) were recruited from the subject pool of the 
Max Planck DecisionLab. Participants were paid a show-up fee of 5 Euro and were tested in groups (group size 
ranged from 8 to 12 in multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (1) our study 
materials were translated into German and (2) participants made their contributions in Euros with a maximum 
contribution for each participant of 4 Euro. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol. After the 
exclusion of students who were not native speakers of German (n = 18), those who did not move the slider to 
provide a contribution (n=5), those who were younger than 18 (n = 5) or older than 35 (n = 2), and students of 
economics and psychology (n = 12), our total sample for the analysis consisted of 154 participants (Time 
Pressure n=79, Forced Delay n=75). Data from 2 additional participants in the forced delay condition were not 
included in the analysis due to a coding error that removed their age from the data file. The missing information 
was only recovered after the data for the RRR had been finalized. Their data are provided on OSF. 
 
Jennifer S. Trueblood, Vanderbilt University 
Lisa Guo, University of California, Irvine 
OSF page: https://osf.io/3km2q/ 
A total of 156 students (Time Pressure n=78; Forced Delay n=78) were recruited from the Department of 
Psychology human subject pool at Vanderbilt. Participants were paid a show-up fee of $5 USD and were tested 
in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 24 in multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts without 
changes. The lab we used (Wilson Hall 120) was an open computer lab without dividers between computers (see 
photo on OSF). However, the computers were spaced far apart and we do not think participants felt observed by 
other participants or the experimenter. The lab could accommodate up to 30 participants in one sitting. Although 
our pre-registered plan specified that we would recruit at least 160 participants, we were unable to recruit enough 
people to meet our target sample size before the end of the academic semester, ending with a total of 156 
participants.  
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Oliver P. Hauser, Harvard University 
OSF page: https://osf.io/5hza7/ 
A total of 166 students (Time Pressure n=84; Forced Delay n=82) were recruited from the Harvard Decision 
Science Laboratory subject pool at Harvard University. Participants were tested in groups (group size ranged 
from 12 to 36 in multiples of 4). The provided Qualtrics scripts were used with one change: before the beginning 
of the session, a research assistant entered the computer ID (to help with distributing payments) into the 
Qualtrics survey; participants did not see this question, and the remaining part of the study followed the official 
protocol. Although our pre-registered plan specified that participants would receive a show-up fee of $5, we 
were unable to recruit enough people to meet our target sample size with that method, so 110 participants were 
recruited by offering a show-up fee of $8. 
 
Tei Laine, Université Grenoble Alpes, France 
Laurent Bègue, Université Grenoble Alpes, France 
Anthony Herrero, Université Grenoble Alpes, France 
OSF page: https://osf.io/2z4rg/ 
A total of 223 students (Time Pressure n=109; Forced Delay n=114) were recruited at Université Grenoble Alpes 
campus. Participants were paid a show-up fee of 5 Euro and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 
12 in multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (1) our study materials were 
translated into French and (2) participants made their contributions in Euros with a maximum contribution for 
each participant of 4 Euro. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol.  
 
Johannes Lohse, University of Birmingham 
Timo Goeschl, University of Heidelberg 
OSF page: https://osf.io/6xdzp/ 
A total of 163 students (Time Pressure n=81; Forced Delay n=82) were recruited from the general subject pool 
of volunteers at the University of Heidelberg "AWI Lab" using Hroot (Bock et al. 2012). Participants were paid 
a show-up fee of 3 Euro and were tested in groups. Group size was either 12 or 16 apart from one session which 
we had to run with 8 participants due to no-shows. We used the Qualtrics script provided, but  with three 
changes: (1) our study materials were translated into German in accordance with the other German labs, (2) 
participants made their contributions in Euros with a maximum contribution for each participant of 4 Euro, and 
(3) at the end of the experiment participants entered a personal code that was used to ensure anonymous 
payment. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol. 
 
Dorothee Mischkowski, University of Hagen 
Andreas Glöckner, University of Hagen and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 
OSF page: https://osf.io/3mwta/ 
We collected data from a total of 212 participants, from which n = 188 fulfilled the inclusion criteria (complete 
participation, no missings in the contribution variable, below the age limit of 34 years) which were included in 
the reported analyses (n time pressure = 97; n forced delay = 91). Participants were recruited from the social 
psychology subject pool at University of Göttingen, Germany. Participants were paid a show-up fee of 5 Euro 
and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 12 in multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics 
scripts with two changes: (1) our study materials were translated into German and (2) participants made their 
contributions in Euros with a maximum contribution for each participant of 4 Euro. In all other respects, we 
followed the official protocol. For a different project, after the Public Goods Game we measured Social Value 
Orientation (SVO) using the 15 items SVO Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011), which 
was not included in the original study. Thereby SVO was pre-registered and tested as potential moderator of the 
spontaneous cooperation effect.  
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Tess M.S. Neal, Arizona State University 
Megan Warner, Arizona State University 
OSF page: https://osf.io/bkmd7/ 
A total of 170 students were recruited from the undergraduate student subject pool at Arizona State University. 
After we applied the exclusion criteria, 165 students comprised the final sample (Time Pressure n=81; Forced 
Delay n=79; missing n=5). Most of the students were psychology majors (n=126), but non-psychology majors 
were also allowed to participate (n=39). Psychology majors were provided with 2 research credits in our 
psychology subject pool in lieu of a monetary show-up fee, and the non-psychology majors were provided a $5 
show-up fee in lieu of the research credits. Participants were tested in groups, with groups ranging in size from 4 
to 16 (M=9.38). As described in the “differences from the official protocol” section of our lab’s Open Science 
Framework (OSF) implementation page, we decided to run in groups that sometimes were not multiples of 4 
given the unique constraints of data collection on our campus (i.e., a small subject pool on the ASU West 
Campus and a tight timeline for data collection). We altered the formula for calculating payments to correspond 
with the number of people in the smaller groups in each session (further description on our OSF page). We used 
the provided Qualtrics script with one change: we created an additional question on the first page that asked 
"What is your computer number" into which we could indicate the number affixed to the computer rather than 
the IP address as per the official protocol. This change enabled us to track an individual participant through the 
study and assign them to groups within the session in order to calculate payouts. In all other respects, we 
followed the official protocol.  
 
Julie Novakova, Charles University, Prague 
Petr Houdek, University of Economics, Prague 
Jaroslav Flegr, Charles University, Prague 
OSF page: https://osf.io/a56y4/ 
A total of 203 students were recruited from the subject pool at CEBEX Laboratory (belonging to the CEVRO 
Institute; however, the study was conducted by the Charles University). One participant in the Time Pressure 
condition did not meet the age inclusion requirements, leaving 101 participants in each condition. Participants 
were paid a show-up fee of 50 CZK (or credits in case of students of classes taught at the Charles University in 
Prague and the University of Economics in Prague) and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 16 in 
multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with the following changes: (1) our study materials were 
translated into Czech, (2) participants made their contributions in Czech crowns (CZK) with a maximum 
contribution for each participant of 65 CZK, and (3) as all of the computers in our lab had a shared IP address, 
we added a question asking the computer’s number (which was visible next to each computer) so that we could 
use these instead of IP addresses in paying the participants their rewards. In one instance, a student had to leave 
just after the experiment had commenced. It did not disturb the other 15 participants, so that we decided to 
continue the session, and therefore had an odd number of participants in the group that one time. In all other 
respects, we followed the official protocol. 
 
Roger Pagà, Pompeu Fabra University 
Gert Cornelissen, Pompeu Fabra University 
Daniel Navarro-Martínez, Pompeu Fabra University 
OSF page: https://osf.io/9dpjy/ 
A total of 157 students (Time Pressure n=79; Forced Delay n=78) were recruited from the subject pool of the 
Behavioral Sciences Laboratory (BESLab) at Pompeu Fabra University. Participants were paid a show-up fee of 
3.5 Euro and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 12 to 28 in multiples of 4). We used the provided 
Qualtrics script with four changes: (1) our study materials were translated into Spanish, (2) participants made 
their contributions in Euros with a maximum contribution for each participant of 2.5 Euro, (3) two of the 
questions that assess participants’ understanding of the public goods game, and that specifically ask participants 
which contributions would result in the maximum group and individual gains, used a 11-point scale instead of a 
9-point scale, and (4) participants were asked to type the ID of the computer that they used to perform the study. 
In all other respects, we followed the official protocol. Neither the use of a longer scale in the two 
comprehension questions mentioned above nor the inclusion of the computer ID question were anticipated in our 
pre-registered plan; the longer scale was a side-effect of using Euros instead of Dollars; the closest 
approximation to a 9-point dollar scale from 0 cents to 400 cents in increments of 50 cents was an 11-point euro 
scale ranging from 0 cents to 250 cents in increments of 25 cents. The question asking the ID of participants’ 
computers had to be added because the Qualtrics script failed to detect the individual IP addresses of the 
computers used in the study. The computer IP addresses were necessary to determine the final payments for each 
participant. Since the IP addresses could not be obtained, we were forced to replace them with an alternative 
identifier: the computer ID variable.   
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Marco Piovesan, University of Copenhagen 
Felix S. Døssing, University of Copenhagen 
Erik Wengström, Lund University 
Karoline Ø. Thor, University of Copenhagen 
OSF page: https://osf.io/b4ra6/ 
A total of 227 participants (Time Pressure n = 113; Forced Delay n = 114) were recruited. Because we used a 
different currency (DKK) we changed the amount of possible answers in the two comprehension questions from 
9 to 7. We did this because it made sense to have 7 possible answers going from 0 to 3000 øre (danish cent) with 
increments of 500 øre. This meant that the correct value in the first question was 7 rather than 9, and so this had 
to be corrected for in the data analysis scripts. 
 
Erika Salomon, University of Illinois 
Zachary Horne, University of Illinois 
OSF page: https://osf.io/6j4rb/ 
A total of 202 participants (Time Pressure n = 101; Forced Delay n = 101) were recruited from the paid subject 
pool at University of Illinois. Participants were paid a show-up fee of 4.00 USD and were tested in groups 
(group size ranged from 8 to 20 in multiples of 4). The replication deviated from the protocol in the following 
ways. The University of Illinois Paid Subject Pool does not use study descriptions in its recruitment ads. 
Participants only saw a study number, duration, location, and minimum compensation (5.00 USD) before 
arriving. Therefore, the recruitment ad did not describe the study as a “study of decision making.” In all other 
respects, we followed the official protocol. In one testing session, due to a counting error, 14 rather than 16 
participants were run at once. This was discovered at the conclusion of the session, and the participants in the 
final group were paid as if they had been in a four person group where the two missing participants had each 
contributed all of their money. Since this error was not noticed until the end of the testing session, these 
participants are included in the analyses as required in the protocol. 
 
Narayanan Srinivasan, University of Allahabad 
Ajita Srivastava, University of Allahabad 
Sumitava Mukherjee, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad 
OSF page: https://osf.io/pfzkb/ 
A total of 204 students (Time Pressure n=103; Forced Delay n=101) were recruited from University of 
Allahabad and Motilal Nehru National Institute of Technology, Allahabad. Participants were paid a show-up fee 
of 50 INR and were tested in groups 8, 12, or 16. We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (1) 
our study materials were translated into Hindi, and (2) participants made their contributions in Rupees with a 
maximum contribution for each participant of 80 INR. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol. 
Nine participants were excluded from the final analysis because they did not enter a monetary contribution, 
resulting in 195 participants (Time Pressure n=98; Forced Delay n=97). After removing participants based on 
age, the final sample consisted of 177 participants (Time pressure = 88, Forced delay = 89). 
 
Gustav Tinghög, Linköping University 
Lina Koppel, Linköping University 
Magnus Johannesson, Stockholm School of Economics 
Daniel Västfjäll, Linköping University & Decision Research, Eugene, OR 
OSF page: https://osf.io/6qn3m/ 
A total of 168 students were recruited from the subject pool at Linköping University. After protocol-based 
exclusions, our sample for the analysis consisted of 164 students (Time Pressure n=83; Forced Delay n=81). 
Participants were paid a show-up fee of 50 SEK and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 12 to 16 in 
multiples of 4). We used the provided Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (1) our study materials were translated 
into Swedish and (2) participants made their contributions in SEK with a maximum contribution for each 
participant of 40 SEK. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol. Our study did not deviate from the 
pre-registered plan.   
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Julian Wills, New York University 
Jay J. Van Bavel, New York University 
OSF page: https://osf.io/p9s2d/ 
A total of 148 students (Time Pressure n=76; Forced Delay n=72) were recruited from the Center of 
Experimental Social Science subject pool at New York University. Participants were paid a show-up fee of five 
dollars and were tested in groups (group size ranged from 8 to 32 in multiples of 4). We used the provided 
Qualtrics scripts with two changes: (1) We added two questions that asked "What data collection session is 
this?" and "What computer station is this?". These questions were answered by the experimenters before the 
participants arrived to the study. (2) After completing all the measures in the protocol, participants then 
completed four additional questionnaires. Our protocol also differed in four additional ways: (1) If the number of 
participants who arrived were not divisible by four then any remainder participants were assigned to computer 
stations at the back of the room to complete a separate task of similar length and pay as the one described in the 
protocol. (2) Two additional participants did not enter a contribution so their data were excluded before any 
analyses. (3) Three participants were excluded because it could not be determined that they met the age 
requirements: (a) one participant reported that they were born in 1933, (b), one reported they were born in 1998, 
and (c) one completed the procedure at a much slower pace than the rest of the sample so the experimenters had 
to terminate the session before he/she could provide the year they were born. (4) In one session, the 
experimenters erroneously tested 14 participants. The presence of a 14th participant could potentially undermine 
the instructions about payments, thereby affecting performance in the task. Consequently, we have excluded all 
data from that session (at the recommendation of the Editor who was blind to any results). Data from these 
additional participants are posted on our OSF page. Otherwise our procedure was exactly as stated in the 
protocol.  
 
Conny E. Wollbrant, University of Gothenburg, and NTNU Business School, Norway 
Kristian Ove R. Myrseth, Trinity College Dublin 
OSF page: https://osf.io/cynbz/ 
A total of 156 students (Time Pressure n=79; Forced Delay n=77) were recruited from the subject pool at the 
University of Gothenburg. Participants were paid a show-up fee of SEK 50 and were tested in groups of 8. We 
used the Qualtrics scripts provided, but with two changes: (1) our study materials were translated into Swedish, 
and (2) participants made their contributions in SEK, with a maximum contribution for each participant of SEK 
40. In all other respects, we followed the official protocol.  
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Table 1. Demographic information for each contributing lab 
 
 
Lab Country 
Testing 
language 
Condition N total 
N 
women 
Mean (SD) age 
N understanding 
personal benefit 
N understanding 
group benefit 
N naive 
Aczel Hungary Hungarian Time pressure 101 80 21.1 (1.8) 62 83 82 
   Forced delay 102 77 21.4 (2.0) 66 84 87 
Bègue France French Time pressure 107 71 20.8 (2.0) 71 91 86 
   Forced delay 114 84 20.7 (2.2) 75 97 97 
Bouwmeester The Netherlands Dutch/English Time pressure 87 70 20.2 (2.1) 71 80 65 
   Forced delay 82 69 20.3 (2.3) 61 72 63 
Espin United Kingdom English Time pressure 77 39 22.6 (3.7) 36 50 39 
   Forced delay 80 45 21.9 (3.7) 34 56 43 
Evans The Netherlands Dutch Time pressure 72 58 19.8 (1.7) 61 69 19 
   Forced delay 72 58 19.5 (2.0) 59 69 22 
Ferreira-Santos Portugal Portugese Time pressure 81 62 20.5 (3.1) 54 57 57 
   Forced delay 82 50 21.2 (3.4) 42 60 61 
Fiedler Germany German Time pressure 79 52 19.8 (2.3) 59 75 54 
   Forced delay 75 49 19.9 (2.2) 56 68 48 
Hauser Unites States English Time pressure 84 56 21.5 (3.0) 75 81 26 
   Forced delay 82 47 22.0 (3.3) 71 78 35 
Hernan United Kingdom English Time pressure 90 56 20.9 (2.1) 63 83 9 
   Forced delay 92 53 20.9 (2.2) 68 84 6 
Lohse Germany German Time pressure 76 37 21.5 (2.4) 50 71 20 
   Forced delay 80 31 21.8 (2.4) 58 71 26 
Mischkowski Germany German Time pressure 97 64 23.6 (2.7) 65 88 29 
   Forced delay 91 57 24.5 (2.7) 62 86 19 
Neal United States English Time pressure 81 61 22.5 (4.1) 53 67 72 
   Forced delay 75 53 21.6 (2.8) 48 63 64 
Novakova Czech Republic Czech Time pressure 101 70 22.2 (2.6) 78 89 56 
   Forced delay 101 60 22.5 (2.6) 78 94 55 
Pagà Spain Spanish Time pressure 79 47 21.2 (3.0) 63 72 21 
   Forced delay 78 45 21.9 (3.3) 62 70 27 
Piovesan Denmark Danish Time pressure 107 30 20.6 (1.6) 74 85 91 
   Forced delay 109 30 20.6 (1.5) 61 97 83 
Salomon United States English Time pressure 98 70 19.9 (1.6) 81 82 74 
   Forced delay 100 63 19.7 (1.4) 79 85 69 
Srinivasan India Hindi Time pressure 88 39 21.4 (2.5) 31 36 26 
   Forced delay 89 45 22.0 (3.1) 35 41 43 
Tinghög Sweden Swedish Time pressure 83 34 22.4 (2.4) 55 71 58 
   Forced delay 81 38 21.6 (2.2) 57 73 72 
Trueblood United States English Time pressure 75 56 21.4 (3.5) 58 73 57 
   Forced delay 68 43 21.4 (3.3) 56 63 49 
Wills United States English Time pressure 75 31 22.3 (2.5) 60 69 18 
   Forced delay 72 27 22.0 (2.1) 50 64 15 
Wollbrant Sweden Swedish Time pressure 66 25 25.1 (3.5) 
24.9 (3.1) 
44 57 23 
   Forced delay 67 31 54 60 34 
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Table 2. Decision times, contributions, and sample sizes in each lab, shown with and without exclusions. 
 
  Time pressure Forced Delay 
Lab Condition N Decision Time 
Mean (SD) 
Contribution 
Mean (SD) 
N Decision Time 
Mean (SD) 
Contribution 
Mean (SD) 
Aczel All Participants 101 13.9 (5.4) 85.7 (20.8) 102 26.5 (11) 80.2 (26.5) 
 Excluding Experienced 82 14.2 (5.4) 87.4 (19) 87 26.3 (10.9) 81.2 (26.9) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 20 8 (0.9) 96.2 (10.1) 99 27.1 (10.7) 80.6 (25.5) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 58 12.8 (4.3) 92.1 (15.3) 58 26.9 (10) 84.7 (22.5) 
 Any exclusion 7 7.8 (0.6) 97.4 (6.9) 49 27 (10.5) 86.8 (21.3) 
        
Bègue All Participants 107 14.7 (6.7) 64.3 (38.1) 114 33.5 (24.9) 64.6 (35.1) 
 Excluding Experienced 86 14.3 (6.7) 65.1 (38.9) 97 33.2 (21.7) 63.2 (37) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 25 8.3 (1.4) 86.5 (29.6) 109 34.7 (24.8) 63.6 (35.1) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 65 14 (5.5) 66.7 (38.1) 71 35.9 (27.2) 62.7 (38.2) 
 Any exclusion 16 8 (1.6) 89.6 (28.5) 59 35.7 (21.3) 60.5 (40.2) 
        
Bouwmeester All Participants 87 15 (7.4) 54.3 (36.7) 82 32.6 (24) 58.2 (33.7) 
 Excluding Experienced 65 15.7 (8) 54.1 (36.5) 63 34.8 (26.5) 58.6 (34.8) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 15 7.4 (2) 69.2 (45.5) 80 33.2 (24) 58.4 (33.1) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 67 15.4 (7.9) 56.1 (37.7) 58 34.4 (26.8) 58.7 (32.7) 
 Any exclusion 6 7 (2.4) 83.3 (40.8) 43 37.7 (29.9) 58.2 (34.4) 
        
Espin All Participants 77 12.7 (7.3) 55 (38.1) 80 24.2 (12.7) 57.2 (35.6) 
 Excluding Experienced 39 14.4 (9.5) 53.4 (42.8) 43 26.5 (13.6) 61.1 (33.9) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 31 7.9 (1.7) 68.8 (38) 71 26.3 (11.9) 55.6 (34.6) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 29 12.3 (7.2) 52.6 (40.7) 32 23.3 (14.3) 57.8 (38.4) 
 Any exclusion 8 7.8 (1) 64.8 (48.9) 15 32.7 (15.1) 51.1 (33.2) 
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Evans All Participants 72 15.3 (8.7) 59 (35.2) 72 32.4 (16.7) 61.6 (29.6) 
 Excluding Experienced 19 13.2 (4.8) 54.2 (39) 22 32.1 (19.7) 54 (30.1) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 23 8 (1.8) 71.3 (38.6) 72 32.4 (16.7) 61.6 (29.6) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 60 16 (8.9) 56.8 (35) 58 32.5 (17.3) 60.5 (29.1) 
 Any exclusion 5 8.3 (1) 60.1 (42.4) 18 33.7 (21.4) 52.6 (32.5) 
        
Ferreira-
Santos 
All Participants 81 13.8 (10) 61.5 (28.5) 82 24.7 (15.1) 60.3 (34) 
Excluding Experienced 57 12.9 (5.8) 61 (29.7) 61 23.9 (10.8) 58.7 (33.8) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 22 8.3 (1.7) 76.8 (27.1) 78 25.6 (15) 59.7 (33.7) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 43 13.4 (6.6) 67.9 (25.3) 36 25.2 (18.2) 62.1 (36.5) 
 Any exclusion 8 8.1 (2) 79.4 (26.5) 28 23.9 (6.9) 60.4 (36.8) 
        
Fiedler All Participants 79 12.2 (4.9) 74.0 (32.7) 75 27.6 (15.9) 66.2 (39.3) 
 Excluding Experienced 54 11.7 (4.5) 75.6 (31.5) 48 29.4 (16.4) 67.4 (38.4) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 31 7.5 (1.7) 92.4 (20.8) 68 29.8 (15.1) 62.7 (39.6) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 58 12.7 (5.2) 74.2 (34.6) 53 28.0 (16.9) 69.5 (37.7) 
 Any exclusion 15 7.4 (1.6) 89.8 (27.2) 33 30.4 (17.1) 70.1 (36.9) 
        
Hauser All Participants 84 11.6 (4.5) 52.1 (39.8) 82 24.4 (14.8) 54.1 (41.1) 
 Excluding Experienced 26 11.8 (4.2) 65.8 (37.3) 35 26.8 (14.5) 56.7 (39.3) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 38 8 (1.4) 53.3 (42.2) 72 27 (14) 51.9 (39.9) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 73 11.7 (4.5) 50 (39.7) 68 23.9 (15.1) 54.7 (41.8) 
 Any exclusion 8 7.8 (1.3) 78.8 (36.4) 25 28.8 (14.7) 55.7 (40) 
        
Hernan All Participants 90 11.5 (5.1) 47.2 (39.3) 92 27.2 (20) 49.7 (40.2) 
 Excluding Experienced 9 16.3 (8.3) 51.9 (33.3) 6 35.7 (34.7) 83.3 (27) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 43 7.5 (1.6) 48.3 (46.7) 88 28 (20) 50.8 (39.7) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 60 11.1 (5.6) 45.9 (40.4) 64 28.2 (22.2) 50.2 (38.8) 
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 Any exclusion 1 7.5 (NA) 100 (NA) 4 36.2 (41) 75 (30.6) 
        
Lohse All Participants 76 13.9 (7.8) 54.2 (38.6) 80 27.9 (15.3) 60.3 (33.5) 
 Excluding Experienced 20 12.7 (6.1) 57.3 (38.1) 26 29.3 (13.9) 55.3 (33.6) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 25 8.2 (1.4) 62.8 (43.2) 77 28.8 (15) 59.1 (33.5) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 49 12.8 (6.7) 55.6 (41.3) 56 30.1 (16.7) 62.2 (35.9) 
 Any exclusion 6 8.6 (1.8) 59.1 (48) 15 32.4 (14.3) 57.6 (38.4) 
        
Mischkowski All Participants 97 12.2 (4.4) 54.3 (35) 91 22 (10.8) 59.4 (36.3) 
 Excluding Experienced 29 13.1 (5.2) 57.6 (34) 19 26 (14.1) 73.9 (30.7) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 29 7.9 (1.8) 60.5 (41.6) 84 23.2 (10.2) 60.2 (35.2) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 62 12.5 (4.9) 49.3 (37.1) 60 22.3 (10.1) 60.1 (38) 
 Any exclusion 3 7.9 (1.5) 72.4 (47.8) 10 25 (9.4) 83.6 (23) 
        
Neal All Participants 81 13 (5.9) 74.2 (34.4) 75 30.3 (18.8) 69.3 (39.5) 
 Excluding Experienced 72 13.1 (5.5) 73.7 (34.7) 64 30.3 (18.9) 71 (38.9) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 27 7.5 (1.8) 86.6 (30.9) 74 30.6 (18.7) 68.9 (39.6) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 47 12.6 (6.4) 74 (36.2) 39 33.1 (21.7) 73.9 (36.5) 
 Any exclusion 14 7.4 (1.8) 94.2 (21.6) 33 33.3 (21.1) 72.6 (36.3) 
        
Novakova All Participants 101 13.3 (6.3) 67.5 (33) 101 25.8 (18.7) 65 (36.7) 
 Excluding Experienced 56 12.5 (6.1) 68.9 (30.9) 55 29.4 (20.3) 74 (27.6) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 36 7.7 (1.6) 77.5 (32.6) 87 28.8 (18.4) 63.5 (35.8) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 69 13.2 (6.8) 65.1 (34.6) 75 25.7 (20.1) 63.4 (37.8) 
 Any exclusion 18 7.7 (1.6) 69 (38.6) 33 31.7 (22.6) 73.5 (28.2) 
        
Pagà All Participants 79 12.2 (5.9) 44.2 (38.8) 78 22.7 (17.2) 49.8 (38.7) 
 Excluding Experienced 21 12.1 (4.4) 39.4 (29) 27 17.4 (12.5) 57.4 (39.4) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 37 8.1 (1.5) 44.6 (44) 62 26.9 (17) 50.3 (36.5) 
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 Excluding Non-comprehending 58 12.2 (6) 37.9 (38) 58 25.4 (18.3) 44.1 (37) 
 Any exclusion 7 8.2 (1.5) 33.2 (37.8) 11 23.3 (12) 42.4 (35.4) 
        
Piovesan All Participants 107 13.1 (6.9) 53.5 (36.2) 109 26.9 (18.8) 61 (39.4) 
 Excluding Experienced 91 12.9 (6.4) 52.1 (36.2) 83 28.2 (20.1) 61.9 (39) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 42 7.6 (1.7) 73.3 (35.9) 100 28.7 (18.6) 60 (39) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 65 11.7 (5.4) 53.9 (37.8) 57 23.8 (15.1) 61.9 (42.5) 
 Any exclusion 26 7.5 (1.8) 71.7 (35.6) 40 26.2 (14.6) 61.2 (42.5) 
        
Salomon All Participants 98 12 (5.8) 62.9 (38.3) 100 33.7 (34.2) 63.2 (36.7) 
 Excluding Experienced 74 12.3 (5.9) 61.8 (38.1) 69 30.3 (24.9) 66.6 (35.6) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 40 7.6 (1.8) 69.4 (42.6) 91 36.4 (34.6) 59.5 (36.5) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 71 11.7 (5.2) 66.7 (37.7) 72 33.9 (27.1) 65.4 (36.8) 
 Any exclusion 19 7.2 (1.8) 78 (39.9) 46 34.8 (26.4) 64.4 (36.8) 
        
Srinivasan All Participants 88 41.1 (32.6) 58.1 (35.4) 89 42.5 (29.5) 50.6 (36) 
 Excluding Experienced 26 38.4 (42.9) 53.6 (40.1) 43 35.9 (25) 52.6 (37.4) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 8 8.1 (2.1) 68 (38) 85 44.2 (29.1) 49.9 (35.7) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 20 42.1 (34.7) 65.9 (39.6) 19 32.1 (17.5) 57.5 (42.1) 
 Any exclusion 0 NA (NA) NA (NA) 7 31.2 (11.8) 71.1 (36.7) 
        
Tinghög All Participants 83 12 (5.3) 65.5 (35.6) 81 30 (24.7) 74.9 (33) 
 Excluding Experienced 58 11.9 (5.5) 68.8 (33.3) 72 29 (21.5) 75.7 (32.5) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 35 7.9 (1.9) 66.6 (41.5) 72 32.9 (24.7) 74 (32.9) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 54 12.3 (5.5) 68.3 (34.9) 55 34.3 (28.1) 75.7 (33.2) 
 Any exclusion 15 8.1 (1.7) 75.3 (36.8) 46 34.5 (23.8) 76 (32.4) 
        
Trueblood All Participants 75 12.1 (5.6) 66.7 (33.2) 68 27.7 (13.1) 66.6 (39.8) 
 Excluding Experienced 57 11.8 (5.1) 70.1 (31.6) 49 28.5 (13.3) 68.6 (39.7) 
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 Excluding Non-Compliant 33 7.5 (1.9) 83.1 (31.7) 63 29.3 (12.1) 67.1 (39) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 57 11.7 (5.1) 67.1 (36.5) 52 28 (14) 63.9 (42.1) 
 Any exclusion 20 7.5 (1.9) 92 (25.5) 36 30.7 (13) 67.6 (40.3) 
        
Wills All Participants 75 11.8 (4.5) 48.3 (39.3) 72 25.5 (23.4) 49.8 (38) 
 Excluding Experienced 18 11.8 (3.9) 39.5 (41.3) 15 32.3 (29.8) 63.9 (34) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 31 8 (1.3) 52.6 (47.4) 66 27.2 (23.8) 47 (36.9) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 57 11.4 (3.8) 49.5 (39.5) 48 27.1 (26.7) 49.4 (39.4) 
 Any exclusion 5 7.7 (1.5) 60 (54.8) 5 43.9 (46.7) 61 (38.5) 
        
Wollbrant All Participants 66 11.6 (4.7) 71.2 (35.3) 67 26.8 (23.8) 69 (38) 
 Excluding Experienced 23 12.5 (6.3) 66.7 (38.4) 34 30.3 (29.8) 74.9 (35.6) 
 Excluding Non-Compliant 27 7.9 (1.6) 80.3 (36.2) 60 29 (24.2) 67 (37.9) 
 Excluding Non-comprehending 41 11.1 (3.6) 65.5 (38.6) 52 26 (24.6) 70.2 (38.1) 
 Any exclusion 6 8 (1.7) 83.3 (40.8) 23 34.3 (34.1) 73.8 (37.4) 
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Table 3. Results of the moderator meta-analyses. 
 
Moderator  Type of Analysis Exclusions Meta-analytic Result 
# of labs, Value [95% CI], Q, I^2 
Trust (lab level) Meta-Regression 
None 21, -3.66 [-8.46; 1.14], 14.89, 2.95% 
All 19, -11.66 [-28.64; 5.33], 13.54, 0.59% 
Trust (individual) Slope difference 
None 21 , -0.14 [-1.38; 1.09], 14.55, 0.00% 
All 19 , -3.30 [-7.52; 0.92], 19.18, 13.81%  
Age Slope difference 
None 21, -0.10 [-0.92; 0.72], 14.57, 0.00% 
All 19, -1.02 [-3.27; 1.22], 13.62, 0.00% 
Horizontal Individualism (HI) Slope difference 
None 21, 0.63 [-1.84; 3.09], 17.12, 0.00% 
All 19, -1.76 [-8.43; 4.91]; 18.25, 2.37% 
Vertical Individualism (VI) Slope difference 
None 21, 0.43 [-1.11; 1.97], 14.83, 0.00% 
All 19, -2.09 [-7.65; 3.47], 26.60, 29.87% 
Horizontal Collectivism (HC) Slope difference 
None 21, -0.38 [-3.24; 2.49], 27.74, 22.30% 
All 19, -0.15 [-10.83; 10.53], 50.35, 61.09% 
Vertical Collectivism (VC) Slope difference 
None 21, -0.04 [-1.95; 1.87], 14.98, 0.00% 
All 19, 1.57 [-6.38; 9.51], 30.55, 21.40% 
Gender 
(0=male, 1=female) 
Effect size difference 
None 21, -3.81 [-10.58; 2.96], 32.39, 38.40% 
All 18, -9.60 [-19.01; -0.18], 8.36, 0.00% 
Subject pool study experience 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
Effect size difference 
None 21, 4.46 [-1.86; 10.78], 25.06, 16.66% 
All 18, 7.17 [-4.29; 18.63], 12.00, 0.00% 
Paid study experience 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
Effect size difference 
None 20, -2.12 [-9.55; 5.31], 24.13, 16.19% 
All 12, -2.48 [-32.03; 27.06], 22.28, 53.20% 
MTurk pool study experience 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
Effect size difference 
None 19, -0.61 [-8.98; 7.77], 15.35, 0.00% 
All 8, -8.07 [-34.78; 18.65], 6.25, 0.00% 
Know other participants 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
Effect size difference 
None 20, -5.46 [-9.41; -1.52], 10.01, 0.00% 
All 17, -6.51 [-20.36; 7.34], 15.92, 0.00% 
Deception 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
Effect size difference 
None 
All 
20, -0.99 [-6.40; 4.42], 14.73, 0.00% 
14, -9.25 [-25.98; 7.47], 10.07, 0.00% 
Note 1. The Trust (lab level) moderator analysis compares the difference between conditions as a function of the mean level of trust for that lab 
using a meta-regression approach. Slope differences were used for continuous moderators (e.g., age) and they reflect the difference in slopes in 
the Time Pressure and Forced Delay conditions as a function of that moderator. It is conducted at the individual level for each lab, and the result 
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is the meta-analytic difference in slopes across labs. Positive values for the meta-analytic result mean that the difference between the time 
pressure and forced delay slopes was larger for larger values of the moderator. Effect Size differences were used for dichotomous moderators 
(i.e., gender), and they reflect the difference in the effect size for each level of the moderator. The meta-analytic result is the average difference in 
effect sizes across all labs for that analysis. Note, though, that some labs were not included in some analysis if, after exlusions, they had no data 
for one condition. The number of included labs is indicated in the rightmost column. The Exclusions column indicates the results with no 
exclusions and when participants were excluded based on experience, compliance or comprehension. 
 
 
 
